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THE THREAT OF MATERIAL 
INJURY STANDARD IN 
COUNTERVAILING DUTY ENFORCEMENT 
One purpose o f  passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 war to 
bring U. S. countervailing duty and antidumping law into conformity 
with the comparable laws of G A T T  trading partners by raising the 
standard required for enforcement action by the International Trade 
Commission. While the "material injury"standard adopted in the Act 
had its origins in the G A  TT, the standard was also injuenced by other 
international agreements, as well as the history o f  U. S. countervailing 
duty law and its application by the I T C -  sources which were often in- 
consistent, if not contradictory. The 'threat o f  material injury"standard 
was particularly difficult to interpret because it was not separately 
defined from material injury in the Act and, unlike the definition of 
material injury, it did not require a showing of measurable injury to a 
domestic industry. The statutory vagueness of the threat standard 
troubled critics who felt it would be an unmanageable and ineffective 
guideline for enforcement action. The author argues, however, that an 
examination of I T C  decisions under this standard demonstrates not on- 
ly that the standard is intelligible but also that it provides an adequate 
guide for a coherent, predictable, and supportable enforcement policy 
which is consistent with the G A  T T .  
Subtitle IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA)' defines 
B.A., University of Pennsylvania (1971); M.A., London School of Economics and 
Political Science (1972); J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (1976); member of the 
Washington, D.C. firm of Santarelli and Bond. The Author extends his gratitude to 
Waltraut Susanne Addy for her substantial contribution to the underlying research for this 
article. 
1. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Title I, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979), now 
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. (1982). The Trade Agreements Act was enacted to im- 
plement the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Reached During the 
1979 Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Interpretations and Applications of Articles VI, XVI,  and XXIII, done 
April 12,1979,31 U.S.T. 513,T.I.A.S. 9619,U.N.T.S. Reg. No. 814, LXXXVIUuly 1, 
1980) [hereinafter cited as Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement], reprinted in 
Heinonline - -  16 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 373 1984 
LAW 43 POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
the enforcement authority of the United States International Trade 
Commission (Commission) to impose countervailing or antidump- 
ing duties upon foreign exporters2 who are signatories to the Sub- 
sidies and Countervailing Duties Code negotiated during the Tokyo 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).3 The TAA 
authorizes such duties when the Commission finds that sales in the 
United States, either aided by foreign subsidies or made at less than 
fair value (LTFV), materially injure, threaten to materially injure, 
or materially retard establishment of an industry in the United 
 state^.^ 
AGREEMENTS REACHED I N  THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 
H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTA]. 
2. Id. "[Tlhe term 'countervailing duty' shall be understood to mean a special duty levied 
for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the 
manufacture, production, or export of any merchandise." General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 
187, Art. VI, para. 3 [hereinafter cited as GATT). 
3. 19 U.S.C. 1671(b)(l)-(2)(1982). The countervailing duty provisions under the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 apply as well to certain non-GATT member countries with 
which the United States exchanges most favored nation preferences. 19 U.S.C. 5 
167l(b)(3). Sees. REP. NO. 249,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprintedin ~ ~ ~ ~ U . S . C O D E C O N G .  
c AD. NEWS 381 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT NO. 2491; Barcelo, Subsidies, Counter- 
vailing Duties and Antidumping A@ the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 269 & n.59 
(1980). 
4. 19 U.S.C. $5 1671, 1673 (1982). The pertinent portions ofsections 1671 and 1673 pro- 
vide: 
(a) General rule. If - 
(1) the administering authority determines that - 
(A) a country under the Agreement, or 
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a corporation, 
association, or other organization organized in such a country, is providing, directly or in- 
directly, a subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation of a class or 
kind of merchandise imported into the United States, and 
(2) the Commission determines that - 
(A) an industry in the United States - 
(i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by 
reason of imports of that merchandise, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to 
any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net subsidy. 
19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
8 . 8  
[Vol. 16:373 
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Of the three possible factual findings of injury, the first, material 
injury, and the third, material retardation, expressly require cur- 
rent, palpable, and measurable injury to an actual or anticipated 
domestic industry.5 The standard for a finding of a threat of material 
injury, however, is far more difficult to define and thus is the most 
susceptible to varying interpretation. It has even been suggested by 
some responsible for administering the countervailing duty laws 
that the threat of material injury standard is at least opaque and 
perhaps unintelligible.6 In fact, a review of the statutory criteria 
found in the TAA, together with the legislative history and Commis- 
sion determinations based on this ~ t a n d a r d , ~  shows that affirmative 
determination of threat of material injury requires somewhat less 
factual proof than does a finding of actual material injury, and 
somewhat more than sheer speculation. 
The purpose of this article is to address and attempt to resolve two 
issues: (1) whether the threat of material injury standard has been 
the subject of coherent enforcement by the Commission, and (2) 
whether Commission interpretation and enforcement of the threat 
of material injury provision can be read consistently with the ex- 
pressed purpose of U.S. participation in the 1979 Tokyo Round- to 
reconcile U .  S. countervailing duty enforcement with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing  measure^.^ 
If- 
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign mer- 
chandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair 
value, and 
(2) the Commission determines that - 
(A) an industry in the United States - (i) is materially injured, or  (ii) is 
threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retard- 
ed, by reason of imports of that merchandise, 
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to 
any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market 
value exceeds the United States price for the merchandise. 
Id. § 1673. 
5 .  Seegenerally SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 38,86-87 (discussing the concrete 
indicia of injury required by the TAA). 
6. See Greenwald, U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing D u p  Laws: Material Injury, F E D .  BAR 
ASS'N J .  38-40 Uan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Greenwald]. Mr. Greenwald was, until May 
1981, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration. 
7. See infra notes 39-73, 76-201 and accompanying text. 
8. See, e.g.,  Note, I m p l m t i n g  "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury Standard in 
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T o  this end, the article first will review the pre-TAA antidumping 
and countervailing duty enforcement prerogatives of the Commis- 
sion under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Act of 
1974.9 Next the article briefly will describe U.S. participation in the 
1979 Tokyo Round M T N  and the agreements which were reached 
pursuant to the 1979 Trade Act. Comparable antidumping and 
countervailing duty provisions of the MTN Agreements on Sub- 
sidies and Countervailing Measures, together with interpretative 
statements, then will be discussed. There will follow a description of 
the provisions and legislative history of the TAA that relate to the 
evaluation of a threat of material injury under such provisions. 
The article will argue that the answer to the questions posed by 
discussion of the two issues raised above is yes, and that it is possible 
to identify coordinates that will permit proper definition of the 
threat standard in Commission antidumping and countervailing du- 
ty enforcement. The article will conclude that an examination of 
Commission countervailing duty and antidumping determinations, 
relying in whole or in part upon the threat of material injury stand- 
ard, shows that the Commission's interpretation of the threat of 
material injury standard has been sufficiently precise and focused so 
as to provide meaningful guidance to the Commission, domestic 
producers, and foreign exporters.'O 
Pre- TAA Countervailing Duty Enforcement 
The dual concepts of material injury and threat of material injury 
were first enunciated in the GATT, which was opened for signature 
in 1947, and which stated in pertinent part that no contracting 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 32 STAN. L.  REV. 1183, 1192-93 (1980) [here- 
inafter cited as Tobo Round Injury Standard]; see supra note 1 .  
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), amended by 19 U.S.C. 1303 (1982). 
10. Due to the relatively small number of Commission determinations that analyze the 
countervailing duty threat of material injury standard, this article, by necessity, will also 
focus upon Commission determinations of the TAA antidumping provisions. The TAA's 
antidumping and countervailing duty "threat of material injuryn standards are identical. See 
19 U.S.C. $ 5  1671, 1673 (1982); see also infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text for a 
comparison of the standards. 
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party could levy countervailing duties without a determination that 
the effect of the subsidization "is such as to cause or threaten material 
injury to an established domestic industry, . . . "1 1 
Before the MTN Agreements, U.  S. countervailing duty law, 
which antedated the GATT, was not bound by the GATT material 
injury requirement by virtue of a grandfather clause in the GATT 
Protocol of Provisional Application.'* Accordingly, prior to the 
Trade Act of 1974, the United States was permitted to countervail 
foreign exports upon a finding of foreign "subsidy" or "bounty," even 
if a domestic industry was not threatened with injury.13 Moreover, 
prior to 1974, U.S. countervailing duties were applied only to 
dutiable goods.14 
The Trade Act of 1974 
The 1974 Trade Act was intended to remedy shortcomings in con- 
gressional implementation of the Antidumping Code of 1967,15 pro- 
viding the then-current interpretation of the antidumping and 
countervailing duty provisions of GATT Article VI, including the 
threat of material injury standard of Article VI (6Xa),16 and to 
harmonize U.S. countervailing duty law with the GATT. Imperfec- 
tions in 1968 congressional legislation had directed the Commission 
to disregard the GATT material injury standard which had been 
agreed to by U.S. negotiators at the Kennedy Round, and to 
employ instead a continuation of the prior de minimis standard used 
1 1. G A I T ,  supra note 1, Art. VI (6)(a). 
12. The GATT Protocol of Provisional Application, signed Oct. 30, 1947, exempts from 
the GATT rules legislation "existing" at the time of signature. Protocol of Provisional Ap- 
plication of the [GATT], Art. 1, para. (b), 61 Stat. A2051 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 308. See Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation ofa Code on Subsidies and Countervail- 
ing Duly Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Da&nces, 11 LAW a POL'Y I N T ' ~  BUS. 1447, 
1453 & n.29, 1457 & n.52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rivers & Greenwald]. 
13. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)). See 
generally Comment, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Revised, Revamped, and Revisited, 17 
B.C. INDUS. a COM. L. REV. 832 (1976); Rivers &Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1453; Note, 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Under the Trade Act of 1979, 1980 N.C .J. INT'L LAW A N D  
COMM. REG. 533, 541-42. 
14. Note, supra note 13, at 541. 
15. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, done June 30,1967, 19 U.S.T. 
4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431. 
16. GATT, supra note 1, Art. VI (6)(a). 
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to determine injury to domestic industry." In a key U.S. concession 
considered by U.  S. trading partners to be vital to U.S. participation 
in the then-upcoming Tokyo ~ound 'ne~o t i a t i ons ,  Congress bound 
itself to vote promptly up or down on each MTN agreement reached 
without proposing amendments.18 
In an incomplete, but substantial, step towards conforming U.  S. 
countervailing duty law with the GATT, the Trade Act of 1974 ex- 
tended countervailing duty enforcement to nondutiable and duti- 
able goods alike, and adopted an "injury" test roughly similar to the 
GATT standard.19 The injury test adopted in the 1974 Act required 
the domestic producer of a like or directly competitive product to 
show that it was "being or was likely to be injured" by reason of im- 
portation of such product.20 The Senate Report stated, however, 
that the intent of Congress was that the definition of injury be "un- 
qualified by adjectives such as 'material' or ' s e r i o ~ s , " ~ ~  out of a con- 
cern that the term "material" as understood in U.S. law suggested a 
measurably higher standard of injury than that understood by the 
GATT signatories or by then-accepted countervailing duty practice 
of U.S. trading partners.22 
The 1974 Act did not define the term injury, but the Act 
nonetheless did ,require that actual or potential countervailable 
harm not be "frivolous, inconsequential, insignificant, or im- 
material.'23 Economic indicia of such otherwise undefined "injury" 
included import penetration, price suppression or depression, and 
domestic employment, profits, and capacity utilization.24 Under 
17. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968,Pub. L. No. 90-634, Title 11, § 201, 82 
Stat. 1347 (1968) (codified at  19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)); S. REP. NO. 1385, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 2, 4 (1968); see Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1457. 
18. 19 U.S.C. 5 2191(d) (1976); S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7255 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT 
No. 12981; see Tokyo Round Injury Standard, supra note 8, at 1186. 
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 et seq.; SENATE REPORT NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 180. 
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(l)(A); SENATE REPORT NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 180; see TAA 
Material Injury Standard, supra note 11, at 90-91 & n.31. 
21. SENATE REPORT NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 180. 
22. See Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1456; seeafso FELLER, I U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE § 18.06 [2] (1979). 
23. SeeSENATE REPORT NO. 249, Supra note 3, at 90-91 .;SENATE REPORT NO. 1298, supra 
note 18, at 180. 
24. See Impression Fabric of Manmade Fiber From Japan, Inv. No. AA1921-176, 
USITC Pub. No. 872, at 4-6 (1978). 
378 [Vol. 16:373 
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this standard, the Commission was able to find a likelihood or threat 
of injury in situations where, for example, petitioners showed 
domestic price suppression and lost sales even in the absence of 
significant market penetration by the allegedly subsidized goods.z5 
In exchange for entering into the Tokyo Round MTN, the 
United States received the commitment of its GATT trading part- 
ners to exert greater control over export-related subsidies that were 
perceived to offer foreign exporters an unfair advantage over U.S. 
industry.26 The other GATT members further committed them- 
selves to the preparation of a list of those "export" subsidies conceded 
by all to be most deleterious to industries of the importing nations.27 
The U.S. concomitant obligation was to adopt a "material injuryn 
standard in countervailing duty determinations against dutiable and 
nondutiable goods alike.28 With this final undertaking the United 
States obligated itself to a material injury and threat of material in- 
jury countervailing duty enforcement practice that could, at last, be 
reconciled with the GATT standard set thirty years before. 
Adoption of the material injury and the threat of material injury 
standards of the TAA by Congress in 1979 was intended to bring 
U.S. countervailing duty and antidumping law into conformity 
with the MTN Agreements successfully concluded earlier that 
25. Id.; see also Chromic Acid From Australia, Inv. No. AA 192 1-32, T . C .  Pub. No. 121 
(1964). 
26. See SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 40-41; Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 
12, at 1454-55. 
27. See Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, Annex, reprinted 
in MTA at 275 (listing types of export subsidies); see also Tokyo Round Injury Standard, supra 
note 8 ,  at 1192. In committing to enter the Tokyo Round negotiations, the Senate Finance 
Committee stated its expectation that ". . . any negotiated concession by the United States to 
extend the injury requirement to dutiable items. . . would be compensated for by conces- 
sions of equivalent value by foreign nations." SENATE REPORT NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 
185. 
28. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 36, 39 confirms that the "material injury" 
tests in U.S. trade laws, adopted in the TAA, implement the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement, supra note 1, and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of 
the GATT, done April 8, 1979, reprinted in MTA, supra note 1, at  3. See Implementation of the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int9 Trade of  the Senate Comm. on 
Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 M T N  Hearings]. 
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year.29 The point of departure for congressional consideration of 
U.S. adherence to a "material injury" test was the GATT definition 
of the circumstances under which a participating nation may impose 
countervailing duties.30 In adopting the material injury and threat 
of material injury language of GATT Article VI, Congress express- 
ly rejected the assignment of a de minimis standard to this language; it 
spoke clearly that countervailable injury or threat of injury under 
U.S. law and by implication should be interpreted by U.S. trading 
partners to mean "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, 
or unimportant." 3l  
GA TT Provisions 
Article VI of the GATT provides that "[nlo contracting party 
shall levy any . . . countervailing duty upon the importation of any 
product of the territory of another contracting party unless it deter- 
mines that the effect of the. . . subsidization. . . is such as to cause or 
threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is 
such as to retaid materially the establishment of a domestic in- 
dustry." 32 By signing the MTN Agreements, the United States 
expressly bound itself to an interpretation of "injury" consistent 
with Article VI.33 
Article 6 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agree- 
ment merges the definitions of injury and threat of injury by stating 
29. See Murphy, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: 
A Preliminary Analysis, 14 INT'L LAW. 203 (1980); Note, supra note 13, at 533-34; Rivers & 
Greenwald, supra note 12, at 1450 & n. 1 1 .  
30. SENATE REPORT NO. 1298, supra note 18, at 74; see Tokyo Round Znjuty Standard, supra 
note 8, at 1186-87; GATT, supra note 1 ,  Art. VI. 
31. REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 4537, 
H.  R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 
No. 3171. 
32. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 ,  Art. VI, reprinted in 
MTA, supra note 1 ,  at 272. 
33. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement of the MTN states: 
Under this Agreement, the term injury shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken 
to mean injury to a domestic industry, threat of injury to a domestic industry, or 
material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be inter- 
preted in accordance with the provisions of [GATT] Article VI. 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2 n.6, reprinted in 
MTA at 262 n. 1 .  
380 [Vol. 16:373 
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that the determinations of injury and threat of injury alike must be 
made by an "objective examination of both (a) the volume of sub- 
sidized exports and their effect on prices in the domestic market for 
like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on 
domestic producers of such products.'q* Article 6 further states that 
threat of material injury determinations contemplate reference to 
factors identical to those relevant to material injury evaluation, but 
also may include review of "evidence on the nature of the subsidy in 
question and the trade effects likely to arise therefr~m.'"~ 
Definition o f  the Threat o f  Material Injury Under the T A A  
The countervailing duty provisions of the TAA require the Com- 
mission to determine whether, by virtue of alleged foreign subsidiza- 
tion, an industry in the United States is materially injured or 
threatened with material injury, or whether the initiation of an iden- 
tifiable industry is materially retarded.36 The TAA defines material 
injury as harm which is not "inconsequential, immaterial, or unim- 
p ~ r t a n t , " ~  and does not provide a separate definition of threat of 
material injury. The legislative history of these injury definitions 
states that the material injury and threat of material injury stand- 
ards are to be interpreted in a manner "consistent with the analogous 
criterion of the MTN Agreement Relating to Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. . . . ,338 
Threshold for Determination of Threat of Injury 
The statute reflects language from the House and Senate Reports, 
which states that material injury should be defined as "harm which is 
not inconsequential, immaterial, or u n i m p ~ r t a n t . ' ~ ~  A Commis- 
sion finding of threat of material injury must be grounded upon 
34. Id., para. 1 .  
35 .  Id. at n.17; see 19 U.S.C § 1677(7)(E)(i) (1982). 
36. 19 U.S.C. $9 1671(a), 1671d(b) (1982). 
37. Id. § 1677(7)(A). 
38. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 87. 
39. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 18; HOUSE REPORT NO. 317, supra note 31, 
at 46. 
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"information showing that the threat is real and injury is imminent, 
not a mere supposition or conjecture,"40 adding that the Commis- 
sion should "consider the likelihood of actual material injury occurr- 
ing."el The Senate authors admitted, however, that some U.S. 
trading partners might view the "not inconsequential" language as 
representing a lower injury threshold than is contained in the 
GATT. 42 
The House Report posits a very low threshold for affirmative 
Commission preliminary determinations of material injury or threat 
thereof, stating that " 'a reasonable indication will exist in each case 
in which the facts reasonably indicate that an industry. . .could 
possibly be suffering material injury, threat thereof, or material 
retardation."43 
The prophylactic nature of the threat of material injury standard 
is evidenced by the Senate Report's statement that the purpose of the 
statutory language is to permit Commission intercession "before ac- 
tual injury occursn with remedies administered "so as to prevent 
actual injury from occurring."4* Commission countervailing duty 
sanctions should not be delayed, the Report adds, where "sufficient 
evidence exists for concluding that the threat of injury is real and in- 
jury is imminent."45 
40. Id. at 88-89. 
41. Id. at 88. 
42. The 1979 Senate Report states: 
The committee is aware that some major trading partners are concerned that par- 
ticular elements of this bill do not repeat the precise language of the agreements. 
This bill is drafted with the intent to permit U.S. [trade] practice to be consistent 
with the obligations of the agreements, as the United States understands those obliga- 
tions. The bill implements the United States['] understanding of those obliga- 
tions. 
SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 36 (emphasis added). 
43. HOUSE REPORT NO. 31 7 ,  supra note 31, at 52 (emphasis added). 
44. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 88-89. 
45. Id. at 89. This article will examine both Preliminary Determinations and Final Deter- 
minations of the Commission as germane to understanding the threat of material injury 
standard. The TAA authorizes an affirmative Preliminary Determination upon a showing 
to the Commission of a "reasonable indicationn of such a threat, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 b(a), while 
a Final Determination requires a showing unmodified by such "reasonable indication" 
language, id. § 1671d(b). 
That the "reasonable indicationn language for a Preliminary Determination suggests a 
lower standard of proof than that required for an affirmative Final Determination is 
382 [Vol. 16:373 
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Statutory Economic Factors 
The statute directs that the Commission should advert to identical 
factors in assessing both the existence and threat of material injury 
in countervailing duty cases, and instructs the Commission to con- 
sider, among other factors, three specific indicia: (1) the volume of 
imports, (2) the effect of such imports upon prices of "like" domestic 
products, and (3) the "impact" of such imports upon domestic pro- 
ducers of such products.46 
With respect to the evaluation of volume of imports, the TAA re- 
quires the commission to consider whether export volume, or in- 
creases thereof, "either in absolute terms or relative to production or 
consumption in the United States" is "~ignificant."~' Regarding both 
domestic and imported article prices, the Commission must con- 
sider any "significant price undercutting" by the imports, or "signifi- 
cant " depression or stabilizing of domestic prices by virtue of such 
importation.48 Lastly, in evaluating the impact on a domestic in- 
dustry, the TAA further directs the Commission to evaluate "all 
relevant economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the 
industry."49 The House Report includes as relevant economic 
factors "production, sales, market share, profits, productivity, 
return on investments, capacity, utilization, cash flow, inventories, 
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and in- 
vestment ."50 
Referencing the volume, price, and impact criteria of the TAA,S1 
confirmed by the Court of International Trade in Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 
No. 82-03-00372 (Slip Op., July 11, 1984), in which the court wrote: 
[Tlhe Court is persuaded that just as the meaningfulness of the law depends on a 
low threshold for a reasonable determination of actual material injury, it depends 
on a low threshold for a reasonable indication of threat of injury. Moreover, 
because the evidence needed to support the indication of threat is more difficult to 
obtain than evidence of actual injury, it is reasonable to predicate the need for fur- 
ther investigation of a threat [that is, by an affirmative Preliminary Determina- 
tion] on the barest indications. 
Id. 
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i)-(iii). 
47. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(i). 
48. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii). 
49. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii); see SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 86-87. 
50. HOUSE REPORT NO. 31 7, supra note 31, at 47. 
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii) (1982). 
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the Senate Report recognizes that for one domestic industry an "ap- 
parently small" volume of imports may have a "significant impact" 
on the domestic market, while for another, the same volume of im- 
ports might not be significant.52 Similarly, in one industry an im- 
ported product's subsidy-related small price differential might be in- 
consequential, while in another industry the identical price dif- 
ference could be "decisive." 53 The Commission has the discretion to 
assign significance to any particular economic factor.54 
52. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 88. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. As this article was in preparation for printing, the Ninety-Eighth Congress 
passed H.R. 3398. Title VI of this bill amends certain provisions of the countervailing duty 
laws, including the threat of material injury standard. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Con- 
ference Report to Accompany H.R. 3398, H.R. REP. NO. 98-1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
173-75 (ordered to be printed Oct. 5, 1984)(passed House and Senate on Oct. 9, 1984). 
The conference-passed language adds criteria the Commission "must" consider in deter- 
mining "whether there is a probability the merchandise (whether or not actually being im- 
ported at the time) will be the cause of actual injury. . . ." Certain "demonstrable adverse 
trend[s]" to be examined by the Commission include: 
[I]  an increase in production capacity in the exporting country likely to result in a 
significant increase in exports of the merchandise to the United States; 
[2] a rapid increase in the U.S. market penetration and the probability such 
penetration will increase to an injurious level; 
[3] the probability that imports will enter at prices that will have a depressing or 
suppressing effect on domestic prices [;I 
[4] a substantial increase in inventories in the United States; 
[5] the presence of underutilized capacity for producing the merchandise in the 
exporting country; [or] 
[6] the potential for product shifting of production facilities owned or controlled by 
foreign manufacturers which can be used to produce products subject to [anti- 
dumping] as [countervailing duty] investigations or final orders are also used to 
produce the merchandise under investigation. 
Id. at 174. The conferees explain the rationale for these amendments with the observation 
that: 
The projection of future events is necessarily more difficult than the evaluation of 
current data. Accordingly, a determination of threat will require a careful assess- 
ment of identifiable current trends and competitive conditions in the marketplace. 
This will require the ITC to conduct a thorough, practical, and realistic evalua- 
tion of how it operates, the role of imports in the market, the rate of increase of un- 
fairly traded imports, and their probable future impact on the industry. 
Id. at 174-75. 
[Vol. 16:373 
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Nonstatutoy Economic Fators 
The Senate and House reports to the 1979 TAA are replete with 
directives and admonitions to the Commission regarding what addi- 
tional nonstatutory factors should be considered in determining 
material injury and threat of material injury cases. 
Demonstrable Trends 
The 1979 report from the House Committee on Ways and Means 
states that a positive determination of a threat of material injury re- 
quires a finding of a "likelihood of a particular situation developing 
into actual material in j~ry ."5~ This Report also recommends that the 
Commission examine "demonstrable trends," including (1) "the rate 
of increase of subsidized exports to the U.S. market," (2) the "capaci- 
ty in the exporting country to generate exports," (3) "the availability 
of other export markets," and (4) "the nature of the subsidy in ques- 
tion."='j With respect to the second factor above, the House Report 
states that high domestic capacity utilization is not, standing alone, 
conclusive of threat of a material injury, and adds that the Commis- 
sion should emphasize evidence of increases in market penetration, 
"particularly if market penetration is achieved by prices that are 
below domestic price  level^."^' 
Both the House and Senate clearly intended that the nature of an 
alleged subsidization affect the Commission's evaluation of "threat 
of material injury."5* The Commission is directed to consider 
subsidy-related evidence uncovered in the course of Commerce 
Department proceedings, "particularly [when] the subsidy is an ex- 
port subsidy inconsistent with the Subsidies and Countervailing 
55. HOUSE REPORT NO. 317, supra note 31, at  47. 
56. Id. One recent determination of the Commission offers a helpful shorthand reference 
to the trends the Commission will consider. In Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and 
Tubes From the Republic of Korea, Inv. No. 701-TA-168 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1345 
(Feb. 1983), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE R P. DEC. (BNA) 2463, the Commission summariz- 
ed: "factors which may contribute to a determination of threat of injury. . . include the abili- 
ty of the foreign producers to increase their exports to the United States, any increase in 
U.S. importers' inventories of the product, and increasing trends in the quantity of imports 
and U.S. market penetration." Id. at 2479. 
57. HOUSE REPORT NO. 31 7, supra note 31, at  47. These factors have been summarized by 
the Commission in its interpretive regulations at 19 C.F.R. 5 207.26 (d)(l)-(3) (1983). 
58. See 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)(E)(i); see also SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 89. 
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Measures Agreement.*59 The Senate Report singles out such sub- 
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(i). The ability of the commission to take cognizance of 
foreign domestic subsidies having a pernicious effect upon U.S. industry was an additional 
part of the bargain by which the United States endorsed the Tokyo Round Agreements. See 
HOUSE REPORT NO. 317, supra note 31, at 43; see also Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 2,  6, 8, 11, reprinted in MTA at 261, 272, 277, 279. 
The TAA defines both "exportn and "domesticn subsidies. "Domesticn subsidies "provided 
or required by government actionn include: 
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with 
commercial considerations[;] (ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential 
rates[;] (iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sus- 
tained by a specific industry[; and] (iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of 
manufacture, production, or distribution. 
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). 
"Export subsidies" are those described in Annex A to the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A). Annex A sets out an "Illustrative List of Ex- 
port Subsidies:" 
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry con- 
tingent upon export performance. 
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on 
exports. 
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or man- 
dated by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. 
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic pro- 
ducts or services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or condi- 
tions more favourable than for delivery of like or directly competitive products or 
services for use on the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the 
case of products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than those com- 
mercially available on world markets to their exporters. 
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to ex- 
ports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or  payable by industrial or 
commercial enterprises. 
(0 The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export perfor- 
mance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic con- 
sumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged. 
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of ex- 
ported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the produc- 
tion and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption. 
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes 
on goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the 
exemption, remission or deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on 
[Vol. 16:373 
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sidies as "inherently more likely to threaten injury than are other 
subsidies,'"O while the House Report refers more broadly to ap- 
propriate Commission evaluation of whether a particular subsidy is 
of "the sort that is likely to generate exports to the United States.'"' 
goods or services used in the production of like products when sold for domestic 
consumption; provided, however, that prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may 
be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not exemp- 
ted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if 
the prior stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods that are physically in- 
corporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported product. 
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on im- 
ported goods that are physically incorporated (making normal allowance for 
waste) in the exported product; provided, however, that in particular cases a firm 
may use a quantity of home market goods equal to, and having the same quality 
and characteristics as, the imported goods as a substitute for them in order to 
benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding export operations 
both occur within a reasonable time period, normally not to exceed two years. 
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by govern- 
ments) of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or 
guarantee programmes against increases in the costs of exported products or ofex- 
change risk programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to 
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes. 
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by andlor acting 
under the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which 
they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they 
borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same 
maturity and denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the pay- 
ment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institu- 
tions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a material advantage 
in the field of export credit terms. 
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertaking 
on official export credits to which at  least twelve original signatories to this Agree- 
ment are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been 
adopted by those original signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies the in- 
terest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which 
is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy 
prohibited by this Agreement. 
(1) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the 
sense of Article XVI of the General Agreement. 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 ,  Annex A, reprinted in 
MTA at 295 (notes omitted). 
60. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 89. 
61. HOUSE REPORT NO. 317, supra note 31, at 47; see generally in fa  notes 169-176 and 
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Special Areas of Concern 
The Senate directed the Commission in its investigation of claim- 
ed threat of injury to "focus on the conditions of trade and competi- 
tion and the nature of the particular industry in each casen because 
rapid increases in market penetration may suggest threat of injury in 
some instances but not in others.b2 For example, where the affected 
domestic industry produces a product entailing substantial research 
and development costs and having a limited market life, increased 
market penetration by foreign exports "may be a particularly ap- 
propriate early warning signal."63 
The Senate also singled out economic indicators associated with 
the purchase and sale of agricultural products for special attention 
by the Commi~sion.6~ Due to the cyclical nature of agricultural pro- 
duction, ordinarily reliable economic indicia may be distorted to 
suggest the vitality of agricultural industry when in fact the opposite 
is true. The report cites the livestock industry as an example, where 
gross sales and employment in beef production may rise as a conse- 
quence of poor economic  condition^.^^ Further recognition is given 
to the fact that government agricultural price support programs tend 
to dislocate ordinary economic measurements because price sup- 
ports mask domestic price suppression by preventing the imports 
from "diminishing the amount received by a farmer below a 
minimum support 
Causation 
Commission enforcement of the TAA has yet to resolve the ques- 
tion of whether a subsidized import must be the "principal" cause of 
a proven injury, or whether it is sufficient that it be but one of 
several asserted causes of injury. The historical GATT-based "im- 
port relief" causality standard required that proscribed importation 
be the principal cause of the alleged injury.67 Since 1921, the 
accompanying text. 
62. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 89. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 88. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. The TAA accordingly prohibits the Commission from entering a negative deter- 
mination as to injury, or threat thereof, "merely because the prevailing market price is at or 
above the minimum support price." 19 U. S.C. S 1677(7)(D)(i) (1982). 
67. See Tokyo Round Injury Standard, supra note 8, at 120 1 .  
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causality standard in U.S. antidumping laws requires that the 
asserted injury be "by reason of' U.S. sales at less than fair value.G8 
Because the MTN Agreements dropped the principal cause 
standard, the "by reason of' U.S. standard now comports with the 
GATT as modified by the MTN Agreements. The 1979 Senate 
Report states clearly that Congress did not intend for the Com- 
mission to decide whether an otherwise countervailable import was 
the "principal," "substantial" or "significant" cause of the alleged in- 
jury.69 It was sufficient that the import be one cause of material 
injury or threatened material injury. The Commission should not, 
this report instructs, engage in weighing the effects of proscribed 
activities of an exporting nation against other benign or non- 
countervailable causes of injury or threatened injury to a U.S. 
industry. The TAA did not contemplate "that the effects from the 
subsidized imports [would] be weighed against the effects associated 
with other [noncountervailable] factors.770 
Nonsubsidy Factors 
The 1979 Senate Report, however, provides a gloss to all these ad- 
monitions regarding export subsidies. In examining the overall in- 
jury to a domestic industry, the report directs that the Commission 
"will consider information which indicates that harm is caused by 
factors other than subsidized imports." 7 1  This latter authorization is 
similar to the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties which 
permits the enforcement agencies of signatory nations to consider 
information which "may demonstrate that the harm attributed 
68. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (repealed 1979). 
69. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 57. The Senate Report continues that "[alny 
such requirement would have the undesirable result of making relief more difficult to obtain 
for industries facing difficulties from a variety of sources; such industries are often the most 
vulnerable to subsidized imports." Id. 
70. Id. The 1979 Senate Report gives examples of "other factorsn such as "the volume and 
prices of nonsubsidized imports, contraction in demand or changes in patterns of consump- 
tion, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic 
producers, developments in technology, and the export performance and the productivity of 
the domestic industryn which may be contributing to overall injury to an industry, but are 
not to be weighed against the effect of countervailable subsidized exports. Id. 
71. Id. at 58; see also id. at 88-89; HOUSE REPORT NO. 31 7, supra note 31, at 46-47; TUDE 
AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979, STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R.  Doc. No. 153, 
pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 435 (1979). 
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. . . to the . . . subsidized imports is attributable to other factors.''72 
As the following discussion will demonstrate, the Commission has 
interpreted the above guidelines in a manner which has freed it to 
regularly measure the effect of one or more nonsubsidy factors 
against noncountervailable causes of asserted injury in determining 
whether the alleged injury is "by reason of' subsidized imports or is, 
on balance, "attributable to other fact0rs.'~3 
Several years of countervailing duty litigation under the TAA 
have produced Commission decisions that interpret the threat of 
material injury standard under the TAA. In many determinations, 
an affirmative finding of material injury has caused the Commission 
to suspend further evaluation of whether a threat of material injury 
also exists.'* The effect of this procedural practice has been a reduc- 
tion in the number of Commission decisions that devote specific 
discussion to the proof required to show the existence of a threat of 
material injury. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of preliminary and final deter- 
minations that track the statutory language and legislative history of 
the threat of material injury, with an analysis distinct from that 
employed in the material injury evaluation. These cases are 
described below, in an effort to point out that while the Commission 
looks at all the statutory and legislative criteria when making each 
determination, each case before the ITC must be viewed at two 
levels: the aggregate level that makes a case qualify as a threat of 
material injury case, and the more specific level that involves a 
search for the point at which the gravity shifts and some factors 
72. Id. Note 2 to article 6, paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that signatory countries 
may consider nonsubsidy factors such as "the volume and prices of nonsubsidized imports of 
the products in question, contraction in demand or changes in the pattern of consumption, 
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, 
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic 
industry." Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 4 
n.2, reprinted in MTA at 273 n.2. 
73. See generally infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text. 
74. See, e.g.,  Cotton Shop Towels From Pakistan, Inv. No. 701-TA-202 (Preliminary), 
USITC Pub. No. 1425 at 3 n.1 (Sept. 1983). 
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become more important than others. 
Due to the relatively small number of Commission countervailing 
duty determinations that serve to illustrate the threat standard, 
however, several Commission decisions involving the identical 
threat standard of the TAA's antidumping provisions also will be 
reviewed to better illustrate the factors considered by the 
Commission in determining threat of material injury.T5 
Negatiue Commission Determinations 
Snow Grooming Vehicles from the Federal Republic of Germany 
Snow Grooming  vehicle^,^^ an antidumping investigation, provides 
a succinct analysis of the nature and amount of proof necessary for a 
showing of threat of material injury under the TAA. This deter- 
mination also provides an instructive example of how the 
Commission will weigh nonimport related causes of a claimed injury 
to a domestic industry to permit, where appropriate, the conclusion 
that the harm suffered by a domestic industry is not "by reason OF 
the importation of assertedly subsidized foreign products. 77 
In this case, a petition filed by the Logan Division of DeLorean 
Manufacturing Company alleged that snow grooming vehicles 
imported from the Federal Republic of Germany were being or were 
likely to be sold at LTFV.78 Upon review of the evidence, the 
Commission observed that the relevant period of poor skiing condi- 
tions had obligated U.S. ski area operators to "postpone or forego 
75. See 19 U.S.C. $ 9  1671, 1673 (1982) for the codification of the TAA antidumping 
provisions. The TAA prescribes a "reasonable indicationn standard for making preliminary 
determinations in both countervailing duty and antidumping duty cases. The 1979 Senate 
Report states that the "committee intends the 'reasonable indication' standard to be applied 
in essentially the same manner as the 'reasonable indication' standard under section 
201(c)(2) of the Antidumping Act [of] 1921." SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 49. 
The ITC has adopted identical factors for consideration in both countervailing duty and 
antidumping duty proceedings. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
76. No. 731-TA-36 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 11 17 (Dec. 1980), reprinted in 2 IN- 
T L .  TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5344 (1980). O n  the basis of its finding that, during the rele- 
vant time period, there were three domestic producers of the imported article subject to 
investigation, the Commission determined that there was no issue of "material retardation 
of the establishment of an industry in the United States." Id. at 5345 n. 1. 
77. Id. at 5345. 
78. Id. 
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purchases of snow grooming equipment ."79 The Commission found 
further that overall recessionary influences, and the relatively 
u recent creationn and introduction to the same market of an improv- 
ed "super snow grooming vehicle" constituted measurable factors in 
the absence of "a substantial replacement market" for the earlier 
generation of snow-grooming pr0ducts.8~ 
Taking these factors together, the Commission found that the 
decrease in the U.S. manufacturers' sales was due, in part, to "a 
sharp rise in selling and administrative expenses. . . [that 
occasioned] the drop in pr~fitability."~' The Commission also 
received evidence that tended to establish qualitative differences 
between the DeLorean product and the foreign product, and gave 
weight to the testimony of purchasers of foreign products who cited 
"differences in quality, service, reliability, or operating cost" of the 
foreign product as their primary purchasing m o t i v a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Reviewing the evidence as a whole, the Commission concluded that 
"the margin of LTFV sales, if any, is a 'technical dumping' not 
proscribed by the statute, and that any decline in the [U.S.] in- 
dustry's position must be the result of other causes."83 
Noting that a finding of threat of material injury requires a 
"showing that the threat is real and injury is imminent,"84 the 
Commission also concluded that projections of anticipated U.S. and 
foreign demand, together with the absence of demonstrable exporter 
excess capacity, precluded a finding of imminent harm to domestic 
manufacturers. Instead, the Commission found that static import 
levels, absence of standing exporter inventory, long leadtime for 
obtaining engines and other parts, and a "strong demand" for such 
parts by European purchasers should "prevent any significant 
increases in imports from West Germany."85 In these latter respects, 
Snow Grooming Vehicles represents a superior example of the Commis- 
sion's analysis of the augury of increased import penetration, 
concluding in this instance that the prospect was small. 
79. Id. at 5347. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 5347-48. 
82. Id. at 5348. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 5348-49. 
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Tantalum Electrolytic Fixed Capacitors From Japan 
In Tantalum  capacitor^,^^ a 1980 redetermination of an antidump- 
ing case, the Commission concluded that a Japanese company's 
plans to increase its productive capacity for these capacitors did not 
constitute a threat of material injury to U.S. manufacturers of like 
products.87 U.S. manufacturers asserted that Japanese sales at 
LTFV, combined with a planned increase in Japanese production 
and attendant exports to the United States, represented an unfair 
trade practice under the TAA.88 
Upon review of the evidence, the Commission noted that fourteen 
U.S. firms operating out of seventeen facilities produced tantalum 
capacitors during 1975.89 From January to June 1976, the U.S. in- 
dustry experienced a degree of recovery in which production and 
shipments improved 37 percent over 1975 levels. This raised the 
level of U.S. production to those of earlier years which the 
Commission described as "showing high capacity, utilization, sales, 
production, shipments, and net profit to sales ratios of 109 
percent."'J The Commission further found that in recent instances 
of head-to-head competition between United States and Japanese 
sellers, U.S. sellers secured almost 57 percent of the sales, even in a 
majority of the situations where the Japanese-made capacitor was 
priced lower.g1 
Cognizant of evidence that Japanese producers intended to in- 
crease production, with a commensurate rise in exports to the 
United States, the Commission nevertheless determined that a 
foreign concern's plans to increase production and exports was not 
in and of itself sufficient under the antidumping law to constitute a 
threat of material injury to a domestic industry: 
Consideration of Nippon Electric Company's plans to in- 
crease productive capacity for, and exportation to the United 
States of, epoxy dipped tantalum capacitors in and of itself 
does not establish grounds for determination of likelihood 
- - - - 
86. Inv. No. A.4 1921- 159, USITC Pub. No. 1092 (Aug. 1980), reprinted in 2 INT'L TRADE 
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5137 (1980). 
87. Id. at 5137-38. 
88. Id. at 5139-40. 
89. Id. at 5139. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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of injury by reason of LTFV sales. We do not believe that an 
increase in the capacity of Japanese producers to manufac- 
ture tantalum electrolytic fixed capacitors portended a threat 
to a strong and growing industry in the United States. The 
evidence gathered by the Commission regarding any in- 
creased exports from Japan did not show real and imminent 
threat to the domestic industry.92 
Tantalum Capacitors, it is seen, represents a successful defense by 
respondents able to persuade the Commission that, far from being 
imperiled, the U.S. industry was, in fact, in a resurgence permitting 
it to preserve, and even enlarge, its domestic market share. 
Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From Brazil 
In the final determination of Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand 
from Brazil,93 the Commission concluded that even if the U.S. steel 
industry was suffering from economic injury, such injury, or threat 
thereof, was not a result of allegedly subsidized exports from 
Brazil.94 For investigative purposes, the Commission found that the 
pertinent "domestic industry" consisted of all U.S. producers 
manufacturing prestressed concrete steel wire strand (PC ~t rand) .~5  
In reviewing the economic health of that industry, the Commission 
92. Id. at 5140. In dissenting statements, Commissioners Moore and Bedell disagreed 
with the Commission's finding of no threat of injury to the stable and growing domestic pro- 
duction of the subject capacitors, stating: 
The projected increase in Japanese productive capacity was believed to be far in 
excess of home-market demand. NEC's increased exports to the United States 
were scheduled to come at a time when price competition in the U.S. market for 
tantalum capacitors was intensifying, and when the domestic industry was still 
struggling to recover fully from the economic recession of 1975. In our judgment, 
the prospect of sharply increased exports to the United States of tantalum elec- 
trolytic fixed capacitors posed a likelihood of injury to the domestic industry in 
October, 1976. 
Id. at 5142. 
It would be correct to question the dissenter's focus on Japanese intent to expand produc- 
tion "in excess of home-market demand," in recognition that such excess production is the 
sine qua non of any exporting nation. 
93. Inv. No. 701-TA-152 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1358 (Mar. 1983), reprintedin ~ I N T ' L  
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 11 15 (1983). 
94. Id. at 1116, 1120. 
95. Id. 
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concluded that producers of PC strand generally were healthy and 
enjoying increased productivity, some increased capacity, relatively 
high domestic capacity utilization, increased worker compensation, 
and no important changes in the number of persons empl0yed.~6 
The Commission attributed a showing of recent decline in domestic 
capacity utilization to the noted increased domestic productive 
capacity .97 Importantly, the Commission was persuaded that the 
U.S. producers competing most directly with Brazilian imports 
were, in fact, "expanding v igorou~ly . '~~  
The Commission staff could not verify the petitioners' allegations 
of price suppression or depression, and only two claims of domestic 
sales lost to Brazilian imports appeared to be due to a lower cost of 
the Brazilian product.99 As to the market penetration of Brazilian 
PC strand, the market had declined slightly during the period under 
investigation, and there was no showing of aggressive pricing by 
Brazilian exporters intent upon increasing such market share.100 
The Commission also found the absence of a showing that Brazilian 
imports were increasing in either absolute or relative terms. Cou- 
pled with an insignificant level of domestic importer inventories and 
lack of evidence that Brazilian producers probably would use ex- 
isting excess capacity to increase exports of PC strand, the Commis- 
sion concluded that the Brazilian exports posed no threat of material 
injury to the U.S. industry.lO' 
Certain Commuter Airplanes From Brazil 
The Commission conducted a similar examination of export 
trends in Certain Commuter Airplanes.102 In that action, the Commis- 
sion concluded that although it was likely that the exporter in ques- 
tion would continue to rely substantially upon exports to the 
lucrative U.S. market, "deliveries of imports from Brazil [had] not 
increased."l03 As to exporter capacity, the Commission observed 
that the petitioner had not presented "information on Brazilian 
96. Id. at 1118. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1120. 
99. Id. at 1 1  19. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1120. 
102. Inv. No. 701-TA-188 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1291 (Sept. 1982), reprinted 
in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1956 (1983). 
103. Id. at 1962. 
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[manufacturing] capacity [or] sufficient information with respect to 
the likelihood that Brazilian exports will be increasingly directed to 
the United States."lO* 
Together, Snow Grooming Vehicles, Tantalum C'apacitors, and Certain 
Commuter Air-lanes show a Commission willingness to credit 
respondents' evidence that the import trends were sufficiently static 
so as not to support a conclusion that they would expand significant- 
ly, or that the putative injured party was, contrary to its claims, able 
to compete successfully with the imports. 
Affirmatiue Commission Determinations 
Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. u. United States 
In contrast to these negative determinations, the Commission 
made an affirmative determination of threat to material injury in 
Alberta Gas Chemicals,l05 a methyl alchohol antidumping proceeding. 
In this case, a Canadian importer of methyl alcohol contested a 
Commission antidumping order in which the Commission held that 
domestic producers of methyl alchohol were likely to be injured by 
increased LTFV imports from Canada.106 Key to the Commission's 
finding below was its belief that Alberta would expand its produc- 
tivity at some point.107 Cognizant that the pendency of Commission 
enforcement proceedings and the possibility of an adverse outcome 
could affect the level of future imports, the Commission majority 
predicted that "the outcome of this investigation conceivably may be 
a factor in the final decision of the foreign firm's expansion plans."lo8 
In its final determination, the Commission concluded that "if 
[Alberta Gas] has increased capacity and additional product 
availability and is able to continue to sell at LTFV to the U.S. 
market, the likelihood of increased penetration and injury to the 
domestic market is apparent."log 
104. Id. 
105. Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 791 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1981), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1481, 1489 (1981). 
106. 515 F. Supp. at 783, ~INT'LTRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1482 (citingMethy1 Alcohol 
from Canada, Inv. No. AA 1921-202, 44 Fed. Reg. 40734 Uuly 12, 1979)). 
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Court of International Trade's Reversal 
The Commission's affirmative Final Determination was reversed, 
however, by the Court of International Trade."" Contrary to the 
Commission's finding, the court decided that Alberta Gas' expan- 
(6 n sion plans were uncertain, and dependent upon "several con- 
tingencies," among which was included financing. ''1 The court held 
that the Commission had departed impermissibly from the 1979 
Senate Report standard which required a showing that "the threat is 
real and injury is imminent, not mere supposition or conjecture.""* 
[Elven if AGCI has immediately decided to expand its pro- 
duction facilities, production in such facilities could not com- 
mence until 1982 at the earliest, assuming there were no un- 
foreseen delays. . . . In summary, the record before the Com- 
mission shows simply a mere possibility that injury might oc- 
cur at some remote future time.l13 
Thus, another important factor for reversal was the court's assess- 
ment that any increase in imports would only take effect at some in- 
definite point in the future. l t 4  
Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice j o m  Brazil 
The Commission's most complete treatment of the threat of 
material injury standard in a countervailing duty proceeding was set 
forth in Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice,*'5 a distinctive decision in 
that the Commission found that the subject imports posed a threat of 
material injury without a concommitant finding of present material 
injury. The Commission proceeding on frozen concentrated 
orange juice (FCOJ) commenced in December, 1982 following 
110. 515 F. Supp. at 791, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1489. 
1 1 1 .  Id., 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1488. 
112. 515 F. Supp. at 790, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1488. 
113. 515 F. Supp. at 791, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1488-89. 
114. 515 F. Supp. at 791, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1488. 
115. Inv. No. 701-TA-184 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406 (July 1983), summarized in 5 
INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1391 (1983). 
116. Id. at 9.  
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a preliminary determination by the Department of Commerce that 
it had a reasonable basis to believe that the Brazilian government 
was offering subsidies to Brazilian FCOJ producers and export- 
ers.l17 
In reviewing the condition of the U.S. industry, Chairman Eckes 
recited the losses sustained by U.S. growers in "unprecedented 
back-to-back freezes in 198018 1 and 198 1/82 .""a Recent peak 
Florida production of 206.7 million boxes in 1979-80 had declined to 
172.4 million boxes in 1980-81 and to 125.8 million boxes in 
198 1-82. l t 9  Domestic production of FCOJ from Florida oranges 
tracked these downward trends.l20 The Commission established 
that the pertinent "domestic industry" included all United States 
growers and processors. 121 
Chairman Eckes conceded that the economic indicia of threaten- 
ed injury presented multiple impediments to the ordinary assess- 
ment of pricing data, including recognition that as many U.S. pro- 
cessors used Brazilian FCOJ in blends with Florida FCOJ, no 
means existed for relating price differentials to difference in quality. 
Further, there existed in the retail orange juice market substantial 
"consumer brand loyalties and competition from other juice pro- 
d u c t ~ . " ~ ~ ~  "For these reasons," Chairman Eckes wrote, "it is difficult 
to trace either the present or future impact of these subsidized im- 
ports on domestic pricing, which would normally be a key indicator 
in an injury analysis of agricultural c~mrnodities."l~~ 
While putting aside the above pricing factors, Chairman Eckes 
nevertheless reached conclusions which permitted the finding that 
the "threat of injury is real and injury is imminent."124 Specifically, 
he found that (1) past import trends indicated that Brazil could in- 
crease its FCOJ exports to the United States by 115 percent from 
1978-79 through 1981-82; (2) as of the time of the investigation, 
117. Id. ; Prelim. Determination, Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 56,528 (1982). 
118. Id. at 5. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 3. Florida growers produce "almost alln round oranges used in producing 
FCOJ, and approximately 85 percent of the Florida round orange crop is used to produce 
FCOJ. Id. at 5 (views of Chmn. Eckes). 
122. Id. at 9. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 9-11. 
[Vol. 16:373 
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significant amounts of Brazilian FCOJ remained in U.S. 
warehouses; (3) Brazilian FCOJ 1983-84 production probably 
would fill Brazilian storage facilities by July 1984, the beginning of 
the 1984 processing cycle; (4) Brazil's FCOJ exports demonstrated 
an "increasing reliance on the U.S. market," with the U.S. share of 
Brazilian exports reaching 57 percent in 1982; and (5) it was likely 
that Brazil's domestic consumption of its FCOJ production would 
remain "flat," at about 5 percent of Brazilian production.l25 Taken 
in the aggregate, U. S. consumption trends and Brazilian export 
capacity, Chairman Eckes determined, required a finding that the 
Brazilian exports posed a "threat of material injury."l26 Chairman 
Eckes concluded: 
Given the constraints imposed by the cost and physical 
limitations of storage facilities, as well as limited export 
markets, the incentive is present and real to export at least 
historical if not increased amounts to the United States. Ex- 
ports to the United States at past levels will be injurious, as 
domestic production continues to recover to pre-freeze 
levels. Such imports will no longer supplement short-fall in 
production, but will begin to displace recovering domestic 
production. The impact of this displacement will be mag- 
nified by the fact that U.S. consumption trends have essen- 
tially been flat for the past four crop years and there is 
nothing in the record which would argue any significant 
change in those trend~.12~ 
Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice offers additional insight into the 
weight which the Commission will give to the nature of the alleged 
foreign subsidy in reaching its conclusions on threat of material in- 
jury. Chairman Eckes highlighted the Department of Commerce's 
conclusion that the subsidies at issue -"preferential working capital 
financing for exports and income tax exemption for export 
earnings"- were both programs "designed to promote exports and 
tied to export perf0rmance,"12~ and, in a reading consistent with the 
TAA, the legislative history, and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
125. Id. at 10-11. 
126. Id. at 3. 
127. Id. at 12. 
128. Id. at 13; 47 Fed. Reg. 56,528 (1982). 
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Countervailing Measures, "inherently more likely to threaten injury 
than are other subsidies.n129 
Choline Chloride From Canada and the United Kingdom 
Excess capacity of the foreign exporter and declining "key in- 
dicators" of the domestic industry again were determinative to the 
Commission's affirmative preliminary determination of unlawful 
dumping in Choline Chloride. J30 Viewing the markets for liquid and 
dry choline chloride as essentially interchangeable, the Commission 
concluded that there was one domestic industry comprised of five 
producers. 131 Domestic shipments had fallen consistently from 1980 
to 1982, with an additional decline in the first three quarters of 
1983.'3= The petitioner offered additional evidence of two domestic 
producers' lowered gross profit margins and operating profit 
margins during the same period. 133 
Canadian exports to the United States expanded substantially 
during this same period, and nearly doubled in the first three- 
quarters of 1983, periods during which U . S. consumption declined 
or showed only slight increases.134 Imports from the United 
Kingdom which began in 1982 showed commensurate gains, with 
much of the imported product still in U.S. inventory at the time of 
the Commission investigations. '35 
Of particular importance to the Commission was the fact that the 
most significant Canadian producer of choline chloride recently had 
made capital improvements which increased its capacity by 60 per- 
cent Similarly, the United Kingdom producer was producing at 
"less than full capacity.n137 Both foreign concerns produced choline 
129. Id. at 13; see Certain Tool Steels from Brazil, Inv. No. 701-TA-187, USITC Pub. 
No. 1403 (July 1983). 
130. Inv. Nos. 731-TA-155 and 731-TA-156 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1473 
(Dec. 1983). Choline chloride is a synthetic nutritive supplement added to poultry and 
swine feed to promote growth. Id. at 3. 
131. Id. at 5. 
132. Id. at 6 .  
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 7. 
135. Id. at 9-10. The ratio of imports from the United Kingdom to U.S. consumption 
nearly doubled from the first half of 1982 to the first half of 1983. Id. 
136. Id. at 9. 
137. Id. at 10. 
[Vol. 16:373 
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chloride principally for export. This "orientation toward imports," 
taken together with the accumulated inventory of exports and the 
unused capacity of both exporting nations, led Chairman Eckes and 
Commissioner Stern to find "a reasonable indication of threat of 
material injury."138 
Hot-Rolled Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil 
The Commission's preliminary determination in Hot-Rolled 
Stainless Steel Bar from B r a ~ i P 3 ~  affirmatively found threat of material 
injury from Brazilian exports of both hot-rolled and cold-formed 
bar.140 The decision is an instructive example of how the Commis- 
sion merges its evaluation of the threat of material injury criteria 
with the criteria for material injury to permit a more thorough 
assessment of all pertinent economic indicia in measuring threat of 
injury. It is also a good example of the Commission's use of the ratio 
of U. S. imports to U. S. consumption to weigh the effect of such im- 
ports on the domestic industry.141 
The Commission determined that U.S. producers of hot-rolled 
bar and cold-formed bar constituted two distinct domestic in- 
dustries.142 Evidence before the Commission showed that the 
economic condition of the U.S. hot-rolled bar industry deteriorated 
in the 1979-81 period under investigation, with domestic shipments 
down markedly and a showing of measurable negative employment 
trends.143 "Hours paid" to employees-a factor the Commission 
found to be "a more informative indicator" of lost employment in an 
industry experiencing reduced hours and furloughs - dropped for 
many responding producers, while sales, gross profits, and net pro- 
fits also d e ~ 1 i n e d . l ~ ~  
138. Id. at 10 n.56. 
139. Inv. Nos. 701-TA-179 to 181 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1276 (August 1982). 
140. Chairman Eckes and Commissioners Stern and Haggert reached this conclusion as 
to the "threat of material injury" from the importation of both hot-rolled and cold-formed 
bar. Id. at 5 n. 1. As to a third product, wire rod, the same Commissioners chose not to reach 
the threat of material injury issue after finding "reasonable indicationn of material injury. 
Id. at 5 n.2. 
141. See i n f a  notes 151-155 and accompanying text. 
142. Id. at 9. Hot-rolled bar and cold-formed bar are semi-finished products having ap- 
plication in the manufacture of, interalia , pump shafts, ball bearings, automotive parts, and 
medical instruments 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 9-10. 
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In contrast, during the 1980-81 period hot-rolled bar imports 
from Brazil rose nearly 20 percent,l45 and cold-formed bar imports 
by an even higher percentage.146 For both products the ratio of im- 
ports from Brazil to U.S. consumption rose ~ubstantia1ly.l~~ 
Moreover, in the context of a strong Brazilian "export orientation," 
in particular for hot-rolled bar, and of an increase in capacity of 
Brazil's producers of both hot-rolled bar and cold-formed bar, the 
Commission noted that the United States had become an "increas- 
ingly attractive market" for Brazilian exports of stainless steel bar.148 
This was evidenced further by the fact that Brazilian exports of hot- 
rolled bar to the European Community had declined from 1979-81 
in a proportion congruent with the increase in Brazilian exports to 
the United States.149 Given the evidence, the Commission majority 
concluded that petitioner had proven a reasonable indication of 
threat of material injury.150 
In Hot-Rolled Stainless Steel Bar, the Commission demonstrated that 
it will weigh facts which permit it to conclude that the subject in- 
dustry in the exporting country is strong, growing, and likely to en- 
joy a continuing excess capacity that will require consistent or in- 
creased reliance upon exports.151 In this investigation, the Commis- 
sion evaluated the static and deteriorating condition of the U.S. in- 
dustry in cold-formed stainless steel bar, hot-rolled stainless steel 
bar, and stainless steel wire rod,152 and measured this U.S. market 
against substantial increases in Brazilian exports of the same pro- 
ducts.l53 After finding material injury to U. S. industry manufactur- 
ing these products, the Commission also concluded that the Brazil- 
145. Id. at 1 1 .  Brazilian imports of hot-rolled bar increased from 450 tons in 1980 to 536 
tons in 1981. Id. 
146. Id. at 15-16. Brazilian imports of cold-formed bar increased from 1,489 tons in 1979 
to 2,378 tons in 1981. Id. 
147. The ratio of imports of hot-rolled bar from Brazil to domestic consumption increased 
from 0.9 percent in 1980 to 1.2 percent in 1981. Id. at 1 1 .  Import ratios for cold-formed bar 
rose from 9.3 percent in 1979 to 11.6 percent in 1980. Id. at 15. 
148. Id. at 12. 
149. Id. at 12- 13. Brazilian exports to the EC declined from 64 percent in 1979 and 1980 
to 47 percent in 1981. 
150. Id. at 13-14, 16. 
151. See, e.g., id. at 11-13 (factors contributing to "material injuryn or "threat of material 
injuryn). 
152. Id. at 9-11, 14-15, 17-18. 
153. Id. at 12-13, 15-16, 18-19. 
[Vol. 16:373 
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ian industry's activities, in light of Brazil's own stable domestic needs 
and in conjunction with depressed United States production, 
created a "threat of material injuryn to the future of U.S. industry. l5* 
The Commission summarized: 
[Gliven recent substantial additions to Brazil's stainless 
steel making capacity and only moderate growth in domestic 
stainless steel consumption, Brazil is expected to continue to 
place heavy emphasis on exports in order not to create a 
situation of over-capacity in its domestic industry. 155 
Worthy of separate discussion are other Commission determina- 
tions that illuminate the Commission's approach to three distinct 
issues: first, the extent to which the Commission is likely to find 
threat of material injury prior to actual importation of the subject 
goods; second, the weight the Commission attaches to the particular 
nature of the asserted or proved foreign subsidization; and third, the 
way in which the Commission has adopted or disregarded the sug- 
gestion in the legislative history that it not assign weight to non- 
import-related causes of injury. 
Threat of Material Injury 
Prior to Actual Importation 
The threat of material injury standard in the TAA, similar to the 
"likelihood" of injury standard of the Trade Act of 1974, permits the 
Commission to anticipate prospective injury to a U .S. industry, so 
that the Commission has been petitioned upon occasion to impose 
countervailing duties before any of the subject products have been 
delivered for sale to the United States. 
Elemental Sulfur-Mexico 
In one antidumping proceeding antedating the TAA, the Com- 
mission signaled its willingness to find an actionable prospect of 
154. Id. at 13-14, 16-17, 20. 
155. Id. at A-44 ("Information Obtained in the Investigationn). 
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domestic injury prior to actual importation. Elemental Sulfur- 
Mexico,156 was an investigation under the Antidumping Act of 1921 
in which the United States Tariff Commission concluded that 
LTFV sale of imported elemental sulfur from Mexico was the cause 
of "significant injury" to domestic facilities of U.S. producers engag- 
ed in the mining and recovery of su l f~ r . l5~  
Included in the allegations of injury by interested parties was the 
claim that in addition to actual LTFV sales, domestic producers 
were being injured by anticipated future sales of sulfur of Mexican 
origin. In other words, the Mexican sellers' quotation of LTFV 
prices for prospective orders created a separate and identifiable 
threat of injury.lS8 The Tariff Commission agreed, based on the 
absence of temporal limitations in the causation standard of the 1.92 1 
Act. "When the statute speaks of 'by reason of the importation,' " the 
Tariff Commission stated, "no tense is implied- i.e., no actual en- 
try of the merchandise need have occurred."l59 Under this inter- 
pretation, LTFV "offers" may be as injurious as actual "transac- 
ti0ns."~6O 
Certain Rail Passenger Cars From Canada 
One determination reached after the effective date of the TAA, 
Certain Rail Passenger Cars,161 comes as close as any reported Com- 
mission decision to basing its affirmative Preliminary Determina- 
156. Elemental Sulphur-Mexico, Inv. No. AA1921-92, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 
484 (May 1982), reprinted in 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5068. 
157. Id. at 5069. 
158. Id. at 5073 (Statement of Reasons of Comm'rs Leonard and Young). 
159. Id. (Statement of Reasons of Comm'rs Leonard and Young). 
160. Id. The Tariff Commission opinion continues: 
The importation, therefore, can be a potential importation, of which offers in 
good faith are a clear indication. Congress was clearly aware in framing the [An- 
tidumping] act that offers can have the same injurious effects as transaction 
prices. As the Tariff Commission pointed out in its 1919 study of dumping: 
Moreover, even the quotation of dumping prices, though no sales in fact be 
made, may occasionally result in compelling merchants with established trade to 
cut their prices in order to hold their business against threats of dumpingcompeti- 
tion. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
161. Certain Rail Passenger Cars from Canada, Inv. No. 701-TA-182 (Preliminary), 
USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1325. 
404 [Vol. 16:373 
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tion upon the mere award of a contract, as distinct from the actual 
domestic delivery of the product of foreign manufacture. This action 
involved a contract awarded by New York's Metropolitan Transpor- 
tation Authority (MTA) to Bombardier, Inc., of Quebec, Canada, 
for the supply of components of rail cars. Bombardier represented 
that while it would not export finished rail cars, it would have finish- 
ed cars assembled at Barre, Vermont, from parts and components of 
both U.S. and foreign sub~ontractors.~6* The petitioner, the Budd 
Co. of Troy, Michigan, a producer of rail car shells, was the unsuc- 
cessful bidder for the MTA award.163 
In finding immediate material injury to Budd in the MTA award 
to Bombardier for approximately 60 percent of the Authority's im- 
mediate rail car needs,l6* the Commission observed that the nature 
of awards of this kind require continued purchaser resort to the same 
supplier for reasons of compatibility of replacement parts and ser- 
vice.165 On this basis the Commission offered independent grounds 
for finding a threat of material injury to Budd, concluding that 
"Budd's future production levels and revenues [would] be adversely 
affected" should the contract be awarded to Bombardier.I6'j 
In a strong dissent, Commissioner Stern argued that there is no 
extant U.S. industry in manufacture of commuter rail cars because 
potential U.S. entrants in fabrication of these cars depend entirely 
upon the very occasional offers for bids from transit authorities.167 
162. Id. at 1327. 
163. Id. The Commission first determined whether Budd, as a prime contractor produc- 
ing car shells, but dependent for final rail car construction upon "the products of other pro- 
ducers of components similar to those which will be imported," had standing as an "industry 
in the United States." Id. But see id. at n. 18 (noting that current U.S. countervailing duty 
law does not appear to permit the granting of relief to a prime contractor under the facts of 
this case). The Commission, however, deferred further evaluation of Budd's status as a 
"prime contractor" for review by the Commission in the course of its arrival at a Final Deter- 
mination. Id. at 1329. The Commission also devoted substantial attention to Budd's asser- 
tion that the Canadian government offered Bombardier financing at a rate of 9.7 percent, 
id. at 1328, a rate Budd had been unable to secure in financial markets in the United States 
or elsewhere. Id. at 1328 & n.29. 
164. Id. at 1328. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. In the words of Commissioner Stern: 
There is no continuing market for rail passenger components independent of the 
transit authority orders. Production takes place when an order is received. A 
potential subcontractor will not produce products dedicated to the transit authori- 
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Stern argued that had Budd been awarded the contract, it would 
have employed Portuguese production, thereby arguably removing 
the putative material injury from the statutory province of the 
TAA.168 
Nature of Foreign Subsidization 
A significant subgroup of Commission affirmative deter- 
minations of threat of material injury emphasizes the importance of 
the nature of the exporting country's export-related subsidy.169 
Plastic Animal Identifiation Tags From New Zealand 
In one Preliminary Determination, Plastic Animal Identification 
Tags,170 the Commission tracked the threat of material injury 
ty specification and maintain an inventory of the products in anticipation of being 
awarded a subcontract. Until a specific order is received, a producer's facilities 
will be used producing other products unrelated to passenger rail cars. In the 
absence of an order for specific components, there are no domestic producers of 
the like product. 
Id. at 1333-34. 
168. Stern stated: 
Budd, unlike Pullman-Standard, would not have produced the shell in the 
United States. The company does, however, produce shells domestically for other 
contracts at its Red Lion, Pennsylvania, plant. 
Budd would have sourced the shell for the MTA contract in Portugal. The 
company's reasons for the decision to source the shell in Portugal included: the 
availability of government-supported export financing in the form of buyer's 
credits; the lack of capacity to manufacture additional shells at its Red Lion plant; 
and the cost savings from the offshore sourcing. Having decided to produce the 
shells in Portugal and finish the cars in a yet-to-be refurbished U.S. facility at 
Hornell, New York, . . . [tlhere is nothing on the record to support an inference 
that the Budd Company would have reconsidered the decision to source the shell 
in the United States had it been able to secure domestic financing equivalent to 
that received by Bombardier or, for that matter, had it been awarded the contract 
by MTA. Rather, another inference is obvious. The company would have 
sourced the shell in Portugal because it was more profitable than manufacturing it 
in the United States. Thus, there is no foundation for treating the Budd Company 
as a 'domestic' producer of shells in analyzing its negotiations with the MTA. Had 
the Budd bid been successful, its domestic shell manufacturing capability would 
not have been utilized. 
Id. at 1334-35 (citations omitted). 
169. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982) (defining export subsidies); for a discussion of 
GATT-related "exportn subsidies, see supra note 59. 
170. Plastic Animal Identification Tags from New Zealand, Inv. No. 303-TA-14 
[Vol. 16:373 
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directly to the facts adduced during the investigation. It found that 
during the period of the investigation, New Zealand exports of the 
tags had increased substantially, and that the New Zealand 
exporting firms had both the capacity and the articulated intent to 
increase such exports.171 With specific regard to the nature of the 
export subsidy in question, the Commission found that recent 
changes in the New Zealand export tax incentives program "reward 
firms not only for increases in their export levels, but also for 
maintenance of their export volume," 17* providing such firms with 
"further incentive" to increase shipments to the United States. 173 
Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice 
The particular nature of the subsidy under review was crucial as 
well to the affirmative determination in Frozen Concentrated Orange 
Juice.174 In that decision, Chairman Eckes cited the Department of 
Commerce conclusion that the subsidies at issue-"preferential 
working capital financing for exports and income tax exemption for 
export earningsn-were both programs "designed to promote 
exports and tied to export performance,"175 and, in the language of 
the TAA, the legislative history, and the Subsidies and Counter- 
vailing Measures Agreement, were "inherently more likely to 
threaten injury than are other subsidies."176 
Nonsubsidy Factors 
Relevant to Commission determinations of material injury as well 
as threat of material injury is the degree to which the TAA permits 
the Commission to weigh various nonsubsidy causes against the ef- 
fects of subsidization in assessing actual or potential injury. The 
1979 Senate Report states that Title VII of the TAA "does not 
. . . contemplate that the effects from the subsidized imports . . . be 
(Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1094 (Sept. 1980), reprinted in 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. 
(BNA) 5149 (1980). 
17 1 .  Id. at 51 53 (Statement of Reasons of Chmn. Alberger and Comm'r Stern). 
172. Id. ; see also id. at 5160 (Opinion of Vice Chmn. Calhoun). 
173. Id. at 5157 (Statement of Reasons for the Afirmative Determination of Comm'rs. 
Moore and Bedell). 
174. Inv. No. 701-TA-184 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406 (July 1983); see supra notes 
115-129 and accompanying text. 
175. Id. at 13 (Views of Chmn. Eckes). 
176. Id. 
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weighed against the effects associated with other factors. . . The 
Senate drafters nevertheless do permit Commission inquiry into 
various causes of alleged material injury or threat thereof to 
determine if the harm is caused by factors other than the subsidized 
imports."178 The TAA conforms to the GATT Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement in this regard, which 
expressly permits assigning weight to nonsubsidy factors in order to 
prevent "the injuries caused by other factors. . . [from being] at- 
tributed to the subsidized i m p ~ r t s . " l ~ ~  Several Commission deter- 
minations adopt this approach by implication. 
Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes From Canada 
In an agricultural antidumping investigation, Fall-Harvested 
Round White Potatoes, the Commission was presented with a com- 
177. The Senate Report cites as examples of nonsubsidy factors: 
the volume and prices of nonsubsidized imports or imports sold at fair value, con- 
traction in demand or  changes in patterns of consumption, trade restrictive 
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, 
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the 
domestic industry which may be contributing to the overall injury to an industry 
SENATE REPORT No. 249, supra note 3, at 57. 
178. Id. at 58; seealso id. at 87-89 (discussing causation under antidumping section 77 l(7) 
of the TAA, now codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982)). The 1979 House report also con- 
tains a provision for consideration of nonsubsidy factors: 
Of course, in examining the overall injury being experienced by a domestic 
industry, the ITC will take into account evidence presented to it which 
demonstrates that the harm attributed by the petitioner to the subsidized . . . 
imports is attributable to such otha factors. 
HOUSE REPORT NO. 317, supra note 31, at 47 (emphasis added). 
179. GATT Agreement on Application and Interpretation, Article 6, paragraph 4, 
states: 
It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of the 
subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of the Agreement. There may be 
other factors which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the 
injuries caused by other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports. 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 4, reprintedin 
MTA at 273. 
180. Fall-Harvested Round White Potatoes from Canada, Inv. No. 731-TA-124 
(Final), USITC Pub. No. 1463 (Dec. 1983). 
[Vol. 16:373 
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plaint that Northeastern potato growers were experiencing material 
economic injury. During the period under investigation, 1980-83, 
acreage harvested fell 14.8 percent, full and part-time employment 
fell 15.7 percent, hours worked by persons engaged in potato opera- 
tions declined 7 percent, and the number of growers reporting losses 
increased.181 
The Commission decided that LTFV imports of potatoes from 
Canada were not "a material cause" of the conceded injury ex- 
perienced by Northeastern producers of these potat0es.1~~ First, the 
Commission declined to find a causal link between Canadian 
imports and the precarious condition of the domestic industry.183 
With reference to depressed sales prices of these potatoes, the Com- 
mission found that "during the period under investigation domestic 
prices and losses to the domestic industry were 'a function of 
domestic production, not of increases in the volume of imports.' "'84 
Turning to its evaluation of threat of material injury, the 
Commission found no showing of increased Canadian exports of 
these potatoes or excess Canadian capacity to generate these ex- 
ports.185 TO the contrary, evidence provided to the Commission 
reflected a decline in import penetration, and did not support the 
growers' claim that activities of Canadian export programs would 
direct potato exports to the Northeast region.186 
It also is noteworthy that the Commission deliberately weighed 
marketing and product factors apart from proscribed dumping or 
foreign subsidization activities that, in the opinion of the Commis- 
sion, contributed to the travails of the domestic industry. 
Commissioners Stern and Lodwick stated that "factors such as 
181. Id. at 9-10, A-33 (Table 9). 
182. Id. at 1 ,  3. Enumerating the four major potato types as long white, round red, 
russet, and round white, and recounting the separable uses and consumer preferences 
accorded each, the Commission found that round white fall-harvested potatoes constituted 
the domestic "like" product competing with the Canadian imports. Id. Of round white 
potatoes, 84.7 percent of domestic production is sold in the northeastern United States, with 
only 1.3 percent of the demand for that regional market supplied by outside domestic pro- 
ducers. Id. at 7 .  Furthermore, 68 percent of total U.S. imports of the round white potatoes 
are also concentrated in that market. Id. 
183. Id. at 4. 
184. Id. at 1 1 .  
185. Id. at 15-16. 
186. Id. at 16. 
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tighter size standards, a perceived higher quality of the Canadian 
potato and more effective marketing organization among many 
Canadian growers. . . contribute[d] to the competitiveness of the 
Canadian product ."la7 Chairman Eckes observed that a perceived 
"higher quality" of the Canadian pototoes, a more appealing color of 
Prince Edward Island potatoes due to the reddish growing soil, and 
the more uniform size of the Canadian product constituted "non- 
price factorsn that explained the competitiveness of Canadian 
potatoes, adding, "[ilt appears that the Maine potato farmers would 
benefit from effective marketing organizations and a marketing 
order which would assure customers more uniform size."lE8 
Unprocessed Float Glass From Belgium and Italy 
In another recent negative determination, Unprocessed Float 
Glass,la9 the issue was whether lifting existing countervailing duty 
orders would create the prospect of future harm to domestic 
producers of the "like" product. '90 The Commission deliberately 
weighed the nonsubsidized import related problems experienced by 
the domestic industry against any injury arguably associated with 
importation of the foreign float glass, and concluded that no harmful 
consequences would follow from lifting the prior orders.lgl 
Specifically, the Commission noted that the U.S. market for im- 
ported float glass, already limited under ordinary circumstances, 
was depressed further by static U. S. housing and automobile 
markets and that U.S. glass consumption was further negatively 
affected by "a growing trend towards down-sized homes and auto- 
mobiles."192 
187. Id. at 4. 
188. Id. at 27. In the same vein, but while reaching a negative Preliminary 
Determination, the Commission in Certain Commuter Airplanes From Brazil, Inv. No. 
701-TA-188, USITC Pub. No. 1291 (Sept. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. 
(BNA) 1956, unhesitatingly ascribed asserted lost sales to customer dissatisfaction with the 
U.S. commuter aircraft producer's engine performance, engine modification, maintenance 
downtime, operating costs, and aircraft durability. Id. at 12-13. 
189. Inv. No. 104-TA-12, USITC Pub. No. 1344 (Feb. 1983). 
190. Id. at 3. 
191. Id. at 10-11, 13. 
192. Id. at A-33 to A-34. In the words of the Commission, 
[tlhe United States has not been a leading export market for float glass produced 
by the four foreign producing firms in question.. . . U.S. demand for float glass is 
410 [Vol. 16:373 
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Iron Bars From Brazil 
The Commission again found that asserted injury to a petitioning 
domestic industry resulted mainly from factors other than import 
underselling in Iron Bars from Bra.zi1.193 In that determination, the 
Commission found that almost all imports of iron bars from Brazil 
during the period under investigation were by one importer, 
American Iron and Alloys Corp (AIA).lg4 On the basis of 
information derived during its investigation, the Commission 
subscribed to the petitioner's account that domestic industry perfor- 
cc mance was generally poor," including its characterization of 
depressed production, capacity utilization, and shipments.lg5 
Important to the gravity the Commission attached to these 
downward trends, nonetheless, was a "soft market" for such products 
in 1982 and the first three quarters of 1983.196 
Conclusive for the Commission, however, were the nonprice 
reasons for AIA's decision to purchase imported iron bars.lg7 Citing 
its authorization to consider nonprice factors, including restrictive 
trade practices and competition between foreign and domestic pro- 
ducers,lg8 the Commission noted that at least two U.S. producers of 
the iron bar had refused to sell to AIA.199 As the other U.S. pro- 
ducers did not offer "full product lines," AIA "had no choice but to 
seek a foreign supplier." 200 Coupled with the low U.S. market 
penetration by the Brazilian imports and the limited foreign produc- 
largely dependent on activity in the housing and automobile sectors of the 
economy, both of which have been severely depressed by high interest rates. . . . In 
addition to declines in housing starts and automobile production, U.S. glass con- 
sumption is also negatively affected by a growing trend toward down-sized houses 
and automobiles. 
Id. at A-32 to A-33. 
193. Inv. No. 701 -TA-208 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1472 (Dec. 1983). The rele- 
vant "domestic industryn was found to be all U.S. producers of continuous cast iron bars. Id. 
at 4. 
194. Id. at 6, 7. 
195. Id. at 4. 
196. Id. at 5. 
197. Id. at 6-8. 
198. Id. at 6 & n.26. 
199. Id. at 7. 
200. Id. 
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tion capacity, the Commission found that Petitioner had failed to 
establish any reasonable indication of threat of material injury.20' 
Even conceding the elasticity of various interpretations available 
to the threat of material injury standard, the language of the stan- 
dard, even if not precise, does represent a sufficiently intelligible 
principle, including articulation of congressional policy, with 
standards adequate to test and guide its execution. 
Conformity w i th  Statutory and GA TT Criteria 
Incorporating by reference its definition of material injury, the 
statute requires that an actionable threat of material injury pose a 
threat of harm "which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unim- 
portant.'qo2 Also adopted by reference is the guideline of article 6 of 
the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, which states that 
a determination of threat of material injury must be made by "objec- 
tive examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized exports and 
their effect on prices in the domestic market for like products, and 
(b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of 
such products.'q03 Lastly, weighing the presence or absence of threat 
of material injury, the TAA directs the Commission to consider the 
nature of the subsidy, and the effects likely to be caused by the 
subsidy, particularly where "the subsidy is an export subsidy incon- 
sistent with the Agreement.'qo4 Read in conjunction with article 6 of 
the Subsidies Code and the Agreement Annex,205 which describes 
export subsidies deemed inherently suspect and effectively per se 
countervailable, the threat of material injury language provides an 
adequate expression of congressional policy, with accompanying 
201. Id. at 8. 
202. 19 U.S.C. 5 1677(7) (1982). 
203. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 ,  art. 6, para. 1 ,  
reprinted in MTA at 272. 
204. 19 U.S.C.  5 1677(7)(E); see supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
205. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 ,  Annex, reprinted in 
MTA at 295. 
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guidelines, to constitute a lawful delegation irrespective of the 
"mumbo-jumbo" characterization of some critics.206 
Commission Application of Threat Factors 
The above discussion warrants the conclusion that for the most 
part, the Commission intelligently has applied the threat of material 
injury factors, specifically (1) the condition of the domestic industry; 
(2) the condition of the exporting industry; (3) the nature of the sub- 
sidization; and (4) causation.207 The commission analyzed the con- 
dition of the domestic industry as reflected in the production, sales, 
market share, profits, and productivity indicia required by the 
TAA208 in Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice 209 and Fall-Harvested Round 
White P o t a t o e ~ . ~ ' ~  As to the condition of the exporting industry and 
the likelihood of increased exports, Choline Chloride 2'' and Hot-Rolled 
Stainless Steel Bar '2 and Plastic Animal Identijkation Tags 2 l  are in for- 
mative examples of the Commission's sensitivity to growing export 
capacity and export orientation of the exporting nation. 
Concerning the weight to be attached to the nature of the alleged 
206. The material injury standard, and aforiiorari the "threat of material injury" standard, 
- ~ 
have been described as opaque and perhaps unintelligible, even by those responsible for ad- 
ministering the countervailing duty laws. But U.S. endorsement of these opaque standards 
was explained as politically necessary to "bridge the gapn between the divergent interests of 
U.S. industry proponents of aggressive countervailing duty enforcement and the interests 
of U.S. foreign trading partners. Many U.S. trading partners considered U.S. countervail- 
ing duties to be a means of erecting nontariff barriers to foreign exportation to the United 
States and of penalizing foreign exporters for manufacturing or other efficiencies achieved 
in the exportation to the united ~ i a t e s .  By this analysis, the language resulting from this 
political compromise was satisfactory neither to the United States nor to its trading partners 
and was "no more than mumbo-jumbom-"essentially meaningless." Greenwald, supra note 
6, at 39-40. 
207. See 19 U.S.C. § 1667(7) (1982); S. REP. NO. 249, supra note 3, at 86-89. 
208. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C). 
209. Inv. No. 701-TA-184(Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406Uuly 1983), reprintedin 5 INT'L 
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1391 (1983). 
210. Inv. No. 731-TA-124 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1463 (Dec. 1983). 
21 1. Inv. Nos. 731-TA-155 & 731-TA-156 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1473 (Dec. 
1983). 
212. Inv. Nos. 701-TA-179 to 181 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1276 (Aug. 1982), 
reprinted in 4 INT'L TRADE DEC. REP. (BNA) 1 131 (1982). 
2 13. Inv. No. 303-TA-14 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1094 (Sept. 1980), reprinted in 
2 INT'L TRADE DEC. REP. (BNA) 5149 (1980). 
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subsidization, Chairman Eckes' review of working capital financing 
in Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice 214 and the Commission's examina- 
tion of commercially unjustifiable low financing in Certain Rail 
Passenger Cars 215 demonstrate Commission attentiveness to export- 
oriented subsidization. Lastly, with respect to the causation require- 
ment that the threat of material injury standard "by reason of' the 
allegedly subsidized imports, Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand 216 
and Certain Commuter Airplanes 21' shows that the Commission will 
decline to make an affirmative determination of threat of material 
injury when the reversals suffered by the domestic industry are fairly 
attributable to other causes. 
Commission Departure from TAA and G A T T  Criteria 
The single current area of Commission countervailing duty en- 
forcement to depart measurably from the policy of the GATT and 
the Code pertains to the levying of countervailing duties upon pro- 
ducts not yet actually imported to the United States. The 1979 
Senate Report conceded that the TAA requirement that alleged in- 
jury be "not inconsequential" might represent a lower injury 
threshold than that provided for by the GATT,21* and the pre-TAA 
antidumping determination in Elemental Sulfur-Mexico found that the 
"by reason of the importation" causation language of the TAA per- 
mitted antidumping enforcement prior to actual importation of a 
product.219 The post-TAA countervailing duty determination in 
Certain Rail Passenger Cars, in turn, based its affirmative countervail- 
ing duty determination upon the New.York MTA's award of a con- 
tract to Canada's Bombadier, a contract award made substantially 
p r i o r  
214. Inv. No. 701-TA-184(Final), USITC Pub. No. 1406Uuly 1983), reprintedin ~ I N T ' L  
TRADE DEC. REP. (BNA) 1391 (1983). 
215. Inv. No. 701-TA-182, USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'L 
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1325 (1982). 
216. Inv. No. 701-TA-152 (Final), USITC Pub. No. 1358 (Mar. 1983), reprinted in 5 
INT'L TRADE DEC. REP. (BNA) 11 15 (1983). 
21 7. Inv. No. 701-TA-188 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. No. 1291 (Sept. 1982), reprinted 
in 4 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1956 (1982). 
2 18. See SENATE REPORT No .  249, supra note 3, at 36; see supra note 42 and accompanying 
text. 
219. Inv. No. AA 1921-92, TariffComm'n Pub. No. 484 (May 1972), reprintedin 1 INT'L 
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5068 (1972). 
414 [Vol. 16:373 
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in time to any domestic delivery of the rail cars.2Z0 
Such an interpretation of the "by reason of the importation" 
language of the TAA has no support in the TAA, its legislative 
history, or the GATT as it has been interpreted. Paragraph 3 ,  
Article VI of the GATT unambiguously limits countervailable pro- 
ducts to products "imported" into the territory of another contrac- 
ting party, while paragraph 6(a) of the GATT makes it clear that to 
be countervailable, it is the actual "importation" of the product that 
must "cause or threaten material injury.'"2l Congruent with this 
policy, article 6 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
Agreement requires "positive evidence" following "an objective 
examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and their 
effect on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the 
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such 
products .'"22 
The decisions in Elemental Sulfur-Mexico and Certain Rail  Passenger 
Cars from Canada evidence the Commission's view that it may impose 
countervailing duties prior to actual importation on the basis that 
pre-import sanctions vindicate the preventive purposes of the threat 
of material injury standard, interpreted by the 1979 Senate Report 
to countenance countervailing duties "so as to prevent actual injury 
from occurring.'?23 That reading, however, cannot be reached con- 
sistently with either the Court of International Trade's reversal of 
Alberta Gas Chemicals, proscribing Commission antidumping en- 
forcement premised upon the possibility of future injurious 
imports,224 or with the GATT and the Agreement on Interpretation 
requirements of actual importation. If Commission interpretation 
of the threat of material injury standard is to complement that of the 
GATT and the Agreement on Interpretation, without stretching the 
"imports" and "importation" language of those two instruments 
beyond recognition, the threat of material injury standard must be 
reviewed from the vantage point of actual importation. 
220. Inv. No. 701-TA-182, USITC Pub. No. 1277 (Aug. 1982), reprinted in 4 INT'L 
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1325 (1982). 
221. GATT, supra note 1 ,  Art. VI, paras. 3 & 6(a). 
222. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 1 ,  Art. 6 ,  para. 1 ,  
reprinted in MTA at 272. 
223. SENATE REPORT NO. 249, supra note 3, at 88-89; seesupra text accompanying note 44. 
224. 515 F .  Supp. 780 (1981). 
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However arguably elusive the TAA's threat of material injury 
standard may be, the Commission has marshalled effectively, with 
only one significant exception, a coherent, predictable, and support- 
able enforcement policy thereunder. Rather than permit the threat 
standard to provide an expedient loophole for imposition of counter- 
vailing duties in cases presenting intricate and difficult economic 
variables, or resorting to affirmative findings of threat of material 
injury in instances in which there may exist significant political 
pressure to do so, the Commission decisions have conformed closely 
to the guidelines of the TAA, the legislative history, and the GATT 
with its accompanying codes, protocols, and agreements. In doing 
so, the Commission's exegesis of the threat of material injury stan- 
dard, and the proof necessary thereunder, consistently has been 
attentive to the analysis of import trends, the predictable effects of 
such imports upon the domestic industry, and the nature of the 
foreign subsidies under review. 
O n  this basis it may be fairly concluded that Commission enforce- 
ment of the countervailing duty law effectively refutes the critics 
who label the material injury and threat of material injury standards 
as unintelligible and not susceptible of predictable enforcement. T o  
the contrary, to date the Commission's enforcement of these stan- 
dards under the TAA has served to further the national goal of 
fairness in international trade by minimizing the potential for 
capricious imposition of countervailing duties, while at the same 
time providing lucid and evenhanded standards for U.S. and 
foreign businesses alike. 
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